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INTRODUCTION

The Double Jeopardy Clause protects defendants against
multiple prosecutions or punishments by the government for the
1
same offense.
Traditionally, and most often, double-jeopardy
concerns arise when the court subjects defendants to multiple
2
trials. When a defendant is in danger of twice being put in
3
jeopardy, the policies of finality and the policies against
4
governmental overreaching invoke enforcement of the Double
Jeopardy Clause, barring the government from harassing the
5
defendant with multiple prosecutions or punishments. But when a
final judgment in the form of an acquittal, conviction, or
punishment does not materialize in the proceeding, jeopardy
6
continues until a final result occurs.
7
The Minnesota Supreme Court recently held in State v. Jeffries
that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars a second plea agreement
after the trial court unconditionally accepts and records the first
8
9
guilty plea. The court also held that a guilty plea does not forfeit
a defendant’s right to plead double jeopardy, because the
Constitution precludes multiple prosecutions and punishments for
10
the same offense, regardless of a defendant’s admission of guilt.
1.
2.

See Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. 163, 169 (1873).
See 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 1781, at 659–60 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1991) (1833).
3. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977) (quoting United States v. Jorn,
400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971) (plurality opinion) (articulating the “constitutional
policy of finality for the defendant’s benefit”)).
4. Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 502 (1984).
5. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 38 (1978); accord State v. Thomas, 995 A.2d 65,
71 (Conn. 2010) (“The policy justifications for prohibiting successive prosecutions
include: (1) furthering society’s interest in protecting the integrity of final
judgments; and (2) protecting individuals from prosecutorial overreaching and
the continued embarrassment, anxiety and expense associated with repeated
attempts to convict.” (citation omitted)).
6. Akhil Reed Amar, Double Jeopardy Law Made Simple, 106 YALE L.J. 1807,
1839–40 (1997).
7. 806 N.W.2d 56 (Minn. 2011).
8. Id. at 64.
9. Some case law has used the term “waiver” instead of “forfeiture”
regarding the effect of a guilty plea on the constitutional rights of defendants, but
the Jeffries opinion clarifies that the term “forfeit” is more accurate, relying on the
U.S. Supreme Court’s statement, “Whereas forfeiture is the failure to make the
timely assertion of a right, waiver is the ‘intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right.’” See id. at 64 n.4 (quoting United States v. Olano,
507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993)).
10. Id. at 65 (citing Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 (1975)).
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This case note begins by exploring the history of double11
jeopardy cases involving guilty pleas. Then it discusses the facts of
12
Jeffries and the court’s decision. It argues that the court correctly
concluded that a defendant’s right to plead double jeopardy
cannot be forfeited by entering a guilty plea, but that the court
failed to properly analyze when plea agreements should implicate
13
double-jeopardy concerns. This case note concludes by asserting
that the court upheld the finality of the judgment but failed to
address the harm this holding will have on the accuracy of future
14
sentences. In the alternative, this case note suggests the court
should have held the judge’s decision to vacate the guilty plea to
the same standard applied to defendants’ motions to withdraw
15
guilty pleas prior to sentencing.
II. HISTORY
A.

The Origins of the Double Jeopardy Clause

The Double Jeopardy Clause of the U.S. Constitution states
that no one shall “be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
16
jeopardy of life or limb.” The Minnesota Constitution similarly
states that “no person shall be put twice in jeopardy of punishment
17
for the same offense.”
Jeopardy is “[t]he risk of conviction and punishment that a
18
19
criminal defendant faces at trial.”
William Blackstone
summarized double jeopardy as a “universal maxim . . . that no
man is to be brought into jeopardy of his life or limb more than
20
once for the same offence.”
As early as the 1870s, the U.S.
11. See infra Part II.
12. See infra Part III.
13. See infra Part IV.
14. See infra Part V.
15. A defendant’s motion to withdraw a guilty plea will be granted if it is “fair
and just to do so.” MINN. R. CRIM. P. 15.05, subdiv. 2.
16. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 793 (1969)
(applying the Double Jeopardy Clause to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment).
17. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 7. This case note collectively refers to both the U.S.
and Minnesota clauses as the Double Jeopardy Clause.
18. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 912 (9th ed. 2009).
19. For an account of Blackstone’s career and the historical significance of
his lectures and treatise, see IAN DOOLITTLE, WILLIAM BLACKSTONE: A BIOGRAPHY
(2001).
20. GEORGE C. THOMAS III, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: THE HISTORY, THE LAW 27
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Supreme Court described the Double Jeopardy Clause as guarding
“against the action of the same court in inflicting punishment
twice” and “from chances or danger of a second punishment on a
21
second trial.” The Double Jeopardy Clause protects defendants
22
from multiple prosecutions for the same offense after acquittal or
23
24
conviction and from multiple punishments for the same offense.
25
Double-jeopardy claims are based on promoting finality,
26
minimizing the
preventing governmental overreaching,
“harassing exposure to the harrowing experience of a criminal
27
28
trial,” and protecting the right to proceed with the selected jury.
B.

When Jeopardy Attaches

Courts must establish when jeopardy attaches in a criminal
proceeding to determine whether the case implicates the purposes
29
and policies of the Double Jeopardy Clause. “It is only after a
defendant is deemed to have been put in former jeopardy that any
subsequent prosecution of the defendant brings the guarantee

(1998) (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
335–36 (photo. reprint, Univ. of Chi. Press 1979) (1786)).
21. Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. 163, 169 (1873).
22. Ball v. United States, 163 U.S. 662, 671 (1896); see, e.g., Green v. United
States, 355 U.S. 184, 188 (1957).
23. Ex parte Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176, 186–87 (1889).
24. Justices of Bos. Mun. Ct. v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 306–07 (1984); see, e.g.,
United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304, 308 (1931); Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. at 168; see
also David S. Rudstein, A Brief History of the Fifth Amendment Guarantee Against Double
Jeopardy, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 193, 194 (2005) (discussing the origins of the
double-jeopardy guarantees).
25. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 33 (1978) (discussing finality in deciding when
jeopardy attaches in a jury trial); Green, 355 U.S. at 187 (concluding that finality
protects defendants from a second criminal trial); Kyden Creekpaum, What’s
Wrong with a Little More Double Jeopardy? A 21st Century Recalibration of an Ancient
Individual Right, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1179, 1182 (2007) (considering the virtue of
finality).
26. Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 501–02 (1984) (holding that continued
prosecution of remaining charges after a guilty plea did not implicate the doublejeopardy principles of finality and governmental overreaching).
27. State v. Martinez-Mendoza, 804 N.W.2d 1, 13 (Minn. 2011) (Gildea, C.J.,
dissenting); see, e.g., State v. Pederson, 262 Minn. 568, 570–71, 115 N.W.2d 466,
468 (1962) (reasoning that double-jeopardy concerns protect individuals from
harassment by forbidding multiple trials); State v. Thompson, 241 Minn. 59, 62, 62
N.W.2d 512, 516 (1954) (stating that no one should be “unduly harassed” by the
State’s attempt to try the same offense multiple times).
28. Martinez-Mendoza, 804 N.W.2d at 13 (Gildea, C.J., dissenting).
29. Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 388 (1975).
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30

against double jeopardy into play.”
“Thus, the time at which
jeopardy attached is best viewed as the point at which ‘the risks of
injury are so great that the government should have to “shoulder”
the “heavy” burden of showing manifest necessity for repetitious
31
proceedings.’”
Courts have consistently held that double jeopardy attaches in
32
a jury trial when the jury is selected and sworn or when the judge
33
begins hearing evidence during a bench trial. But courts across
the country take various positions as to when jeopardy attaches in
34
cases of guilty pleas.
35
In Ricketts v. Adamson, the U.S. Supreme Court considered
the issue of “whether the Double Jeopardy Clause bars the
prosecution of respondent for first-degree murder following his
breach of a plea agreement under which he had pleaded guilty to a
lesser offense, had been sentenced, and had begun serving a term
36
of imprisonment.”
The Court agreed with the State that
“respondent’s breach of the plea arrangement to which the parties
had agreed removed the double-jeopardy bar to prosecution of
37
respondent on the first-degree murder charge.” The Court simply
assumed that “jeopardy attached at least when respondent was
38
sentenced . . . on his plea of guilty.”
Ricketts did not consider whether jeopardy attaches prior to
sentencing, such as upon acceptance of a guilty plea, because the
vacation of the defendant’s plea and the re-prosecution occurred
39
after he was sentenced.
The trial court had sentenced the
defendant, and he had begun serving time, thus invoking the
policies of finality and prevention of prosecutorial overreaching
30. State v. Angel, 51 P.3d 1155, 1157 (N.M. 2002).
31. United States v. Santiago Soto, 825 F.2d 616, 618 (1st Cir. 1987) (quoting
3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 24.1(c) (1984)).
32. Serfass, 420 U.S. at 388; accord Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 36 (1978);
United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569 (1977); Downum v.
United States, 372 U.S. 734, 737–38 (1963).
33. 6 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 25.1(d) (3d ed. 2011);
see also Serfass, 420 U.S. at 388; McCarthy v. Zerbst, 85 F.2d 640, 642 (10th Cir.
1936).
34. State v. Jeffries, 806 N.W.2d 56, 68–69 (Minn. 2011) (Gildea, C.J.,
dissenting).
35. 483 U.S. 1 (1987) (articulating the Court’s only statement referring to
when double jeopardy attaches in a guilty plea).
36. Id. at 3.
37. Id. at 8.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 4–8.
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40

protected by the Double Jeopardy Clause.
But despite these
double-jeopardy concerns, the Court held that the defendant’s
41
breach of the plea agreement barred a double-jeopardy defense.
Several state and federal district courts have concluded that
42
jeopardy does not attach prior to sentencing. In United States v.
Santiago Soto, the First Circuit Court of Appeals held that “jeopardy
did not attach when the district court accepted the guilty plea to
the lesser included offense and then rejected the plea without
43
having imposed sentence and entered judgment.”
The court
reasoned that the “mere acceptance of a guilty plea does not carry
the same expectation of finality and tranquility that comes with a
44
jury’s verdict or with an entry of judgment and sentence.”
In State v. Angel, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that
“jeopardy did not attach when the magistrate court accepted
Defendant’s . . . plea . . . [but] dismissed the charges prior to
45
sentencing.” The court stated that the defendant’s subsequent
prosecution did not violate the double-jeopardy concerns of finality
or overreaching, because the court dismissed the charges to which
46
he pled guilty to prior to sentencing.
In State v. Duval, the Vermont Supreme Court addressed the
issue of “whether double jeopardy prevents a judge from imposing
a harsher sentence on defendant than that originally intended after
47
acceptance of his plea.” The court held that the policy concern of
governmental overreaching was not implicated and that the trial
48
court “ought be able to correct a mistake.” The court concluded
that jeopardy did not attach at the initial acceptance of the guilty
49
plea, and even if it did, “it was not irrevocable.”
Other courts have held that “[j]eopardy attaches with the
50
acceptance of a guilty plea.” In United States v. Sanchez, the Fifth
40. Id. at 4–6.
41. Id. at 10.
42. See, e.g., United States v. Santiago Soto, 825 F.2d 616, 618 (1st Cir. 1987);
State v. Angel, 51 P.3d 1155, 1157 (N.M. 2002); State v. Duval, 589 A.2d 321, 324
(Vt. 1991).
43. 825 F.2d at 620.
44. Id.
45. 51 P.3d at 1159.
46. Id. at 1158–59 (citing State v. Alingog, 877 P.2d 562 (N.M. 1994)).
47. 589 A.2d at 324.
48. Id. at 325.
49. Id.
50. United States v. Sanchez, 609 F.2d 761, 762 (5th Cir. 1980); see also United
States v. Cambindo Valencia, 609 F.2d 603, 637 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v.
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Circuit Court of Appeals clarified that a judge has wide discretion
whether to accept, reject, or conditionally accept a plea
51
agreement, and it is only with an unconditional acceptance that
52
jeopardy attaches. In Sanchez, the judge temporarily accepted the
plea “until she had studied the probation report” but then later
53
rejected the plea agreement.
In United States v. Cambindo Valencia, the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals declared, “[I]t is axiomatic of the double jeopardy
clause that jeopardy attached once . . . [the] guilty plea was
54
accepted.” The issue of when jeopardy attached was not a primary
issue in the case, though, which involved a complicated web of
multiple defendants appealing multiple convictions for conspiracy
to import and distribute cocaine, arising out of similar but distinct
55
incidents.
In United States v. Bullock, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
stated that while “the process of arraignment and pleading has not
been viewed as amounting to jeopardy . . . , jeopardy would attach
56
when a plea of guilty is accepted.” The government notified the
defendants in this case that they had unlawfully taken “migratory
birds over a baited area” and informed them “they could forfeit a
57
bond of $100 in lieu of standing trial.” The defendants sent the
58
The government then dismissed the notice of
$100 checks.
violation, returned the checks, and charged the defendants under
59
the United States Code and the Code of Federal Regulations. The
court concluded that under circumstances involving pretrial events,
where a plea was offered but not accepted, jeopardy did not
60
attach.

Bullock, 579 F.2d 1116, 1118 (8th Cir. 1978) (per curiam).
51. 609 F.2d at 762.
52. Id.
53. Id. “Because the judge made it clear that she was taking the agreement
under advisement, jeopardy did not attach and she acted within the bounds of her
discretion in rejecting the agreement and the plea after full consideration of the
case.” Id.
54. 609 F.2d at 637.
55. Id. at 606–07.
56. 579 F.2d 1116, 1118 (8th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (citation omitted).
57. Id. at 1117–18.
58. Id. at 1118.
59. Id. at 1117 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 703 (1976); 50 C.F.R. § 20.21 (1976)).
60. Id. at 1118.
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The U.S. Supreme Court has held that retrial is barred only
61
In Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, a jury
after jeopardy terminates.
convicted the defendant of murder but deadlocked while deciding
62
whether to impose the death penalty. The trial judge entered a
63
life sentence. The defendant successfully appealed and had his
64
conviction set aside. On retrial, the defendant was sentenced to
65
death. The defendant argued that to impose a death sentence
66
after already having imposed a life sentence was double jeopardy.
67
The Court disagreed. The Court reasoned that a conviction does
not necessarily terminate jeopardy because a defendant can appeal
the conviction, and the same jeopardy continues during the appeal
68
process.
Concerns regarding double jeopardy arise when the defendant
69
develops “a crystallized expectation of finality in his sentence.”
But, as discussed before, neither federal nor state precedent
articulates a rule for when this expectation of finality occurs in
70
guilty pleas.
Disagreement, in part, centers on whether
71
convictions provide the same level of finality as acquittals and
whether convictions prior to sentencing provide the same level of
72
finality as convictions after sentencing.

61. Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 106 (2003); Richardson v. United
States, 468 U.S. 317, 325 (1984) (discussing that double jeopardy “applies only if
there has been some event . . . which terminates the original jeopardy”).
62. 537 U.S. at 104.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 105.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 109.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 106; see also Creekpaum, supra note 25, at 1184.
69. State v. Borrego, 661 N.W.2d 663, 666 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (quoting
State v. Garcia, 582 N.W.2d 879, 881 (Minn. 1998)). See generally 11 DUNNELL
MINN. DIGEST CRIMINAL LAW § 4.17 (5th ed. 2004) (considering the finality of
acquittals, convictions, and sentences).
70. State v. Jeffries, 806 N.W.2d 56, 68 (Minn. 2011) (Gildea, C.J., dissenting);
see, e.g., Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1 (1987).
71. Compare United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 132–33 (1980)
(determining that finality of sentencing is less than finality of acquittals), with State
v. Martinez-Mendoza, 804 N.W.2d 1, 8 (Minn. 2011) (concluding that a conviction
should be treated the same as an acquittal).
72. Compare United States v. Bullock, 579 F.2d 1116, 1118 (8th Cir. 1978) (per
curiam) (stating that jeopardy would attach when the court accepts the plea), with
State v. Duval, 589 A.2d 321, 324 (Vt. 1991) (explaining that “attachment of
jeopardy upon the court’s acceptance of a guilty plea is neither automatic nor
irrevocable”).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol39/iss1/13

8

Light: Criminal Law: The Tension between Finality and Accuracy: Double J

314

C.

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:1

Forfeiture of Double-Jeopardy Pleas

Double-jeopardy cases also confront the issue of whether a
73
defendant can forfeit his or her right to plead double jeopardy.
Prior to the Jeffries decision, the Minnesota Supreme Court held
that if a defendant did not assert a double-jeopardy claim at the
appropriate time, he or she waived the right to plead double
74
75
jeopardy. Minnesota case law had relied on the U.S. Supreme
Court’s holdings that defendants could waive their constitutional
76
rights.
In Menna v. New York, the U.S. Supreme Court explained that
prior precedent did not stand for the principle that all counseled
77
guilty pleas waive all constitutional rights. “[W]here the State is
precluded by the United States Constitution from haling a
defendant into court on a charge, federal law requires that a
conviction on that charge be set aside even if the conviction was
78
entered pursuant to a counseled plea of guilty.” In Menna, the
Double Jeopardy Clause barred the State from bringing the
defendant into court to begin with, so any subsequent guilty plea
79
did not waive his right to plead double jeopardy.
Similarly,
Blackledge v. Perry dealt with the same issue and held that if a
defendant asserted “the right not to be haled into court at all . . . [,
then t]he very initiation of the proceedings against him in the
80
Superior Court thus operated to deny him due process of law.”

73. 11 DUNNELL MINN. DIGEST CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 69, § 4.17(a).
Compare Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 (1975) (holding that a guilty plea
does not waive a claim if the State cannot constitutionally prosecute), with State
ex rel. Boswell v. Tahash, 278 Minn. 408, 415, 154 N.W.2d 813, 817 (1967) (holding
that a double-jeopardy claim is waived if the defendant does not enter the plea at
the appropriate time).
74. Boswell, 278 Minn. at 414, 154 N.W.2d at 817.
75. E.g., State ex rel. Dunlap v. Utecht, 206 Minn. 41, 48, 287 N.W. 229, 232
(1939) (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938) (stating that a
defendant can waive the constitutional right to assistance of counsel)).
76. See Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973) (“When a criminal
defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the
offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims
relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry
of the guilty plea.”).
77. 423 U.S. at 62 n.2.
78. Id. at 62 (citing Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30 (1974)).
79. Id.
80. 417 U.S. at 30–31.
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Jeffries presented the Minnesota Supreme Court with the issue
81
of when jeopardy attaches and terminates in a guilty plea. Jeffries
also presented the court with the issue—in light of conflicting
precedent—of whether a defendant can forfeit his or her
82
constitutional right to plead double jeopardy.
III. THE JEFFRIES DECISION
A.

Facts and Procedural Posture

On January 22, 2008, Erik Jeffries threw a glass egg at his
83
The egg hit his girlfriend’s
girlfriend during an argument.
84
daughter in the face, causing lacerations that required stitches.
The State charged Jeffries with domestic assault, which was
enhanced to a felony because he had at least two prior domestic
85
assault convictions within the previous ten years.
Jeffries reached a negotiated plea deal with the State, and a
86
plea hearing was held on June 13, 2008. Jeffries entered a guilty
87
plea for felony domestic assault. The court responded by saying,
“[B]ased upon the facts on the record, I’ll accept your plea of
88
The court conditionally released
guilty and find you guilty.”
Jeffries, ordering him to appear for sentencing and attend
meetings with probation to facilitate completion of the pre89
sentence investigation (PSI).
On the sentencing date, the court decided to no longer accept
the plea agreement because of Jeffries’s extensive criminal history
90
and the information contained in the PSI report.
The court
91
vacated the guilty plea and set a trial date. The court asked if
81. State v. Jeffries, 806 N.W.2d 56, 61 (Minn. 2011).
82. Id.
83. Appellant’s Brief at 5, Jeffries, 806 N.W.2d 56 (No. A09-1391), 2011 WL
7415262 [hereinafter Appellant’s Brief].
84. Jeffries, 806 N.W.2d at 58.
85. Id. “Whoever violates the provisions of this section . . . within ten years of
the first of any combination of two or more previous qualified domestic violencerelated offense convictions or adjudications of delinquency is guilty of a
felony . . . .” MINN. STAT. § 609.2242, subdiv. 4 (2010).
86. Jeffries, 806 N.W.2d at 58–59.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 59.
89. Id.
90. Id. The plea agreement had been a forty-eight-month stayed sentence.
Id. at 58.
91. Id. at 60.
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Jeffries’s attorney wanted to respond or put anything on the
92
record. The attorney did not object on the record to the court’s
93
vacation of Jeffries’s plea.
The parties reached a second plea deal, and a plea hearing was
94
held on March 31, 2009. Jeffries pled guilty to felony domestic
95
assault. The court accepted the plea and conditionally released
96
Jeffries until the sentencing date. Two days after being released,
the police arrested Jeffries for possessing marijuana, which violated
97
his conditional release.
The court executed the sixty-month
98
sentence, pursuant to the plea agreement.
Jeffries argued on appeal that double jeopardy forbade the
State from prosecuting him for the same offense a second time and
99
that he had ineffective counsel. The court of appeals held that
Jeffries waived his double-jeopardy claim by entering a second
guilty plea and that he failed to show deprivation of effective
100
assistance of counsel.
The court of appeals did not rule on the
101
double-jeopardy question.
B.

The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Decision

After granting review, the Minnesota Supreme Court framed
the first issue as whether Jeffries was convicted at his first plea
102
The court explained that the Double Jeopardy Clause
hearing.
103
prohibits subsequent prosecutions after a conviction.
The court
determined that the trial court unconditionally accepted the first
104
plea and recorded the plea. Based on these two factors, the court
105
concluded that Jeffries was convicted at the first plea hearing.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. The plea agreement consisted of “an executed sentence of 22 months
if he complied with the conditions of release or a 60-month executed sentence if
he did not.” Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. State v. Jeffries, 787 N.W.2d 654, 661–62 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010), rev’d, 806
N.W.2d 56 (Minn. 2011).
101. Respondent’s Brief and Appendix at 15, Jeffries, 806 N.W.2d 56 (No. A091391), 2010 WL 8435269 [hereinafter Respondent’s Brief].
102. Jeffries, 806 N.W.2d at 61.
103. Id. at 60–61 (citing Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977)).
104. Id. at 63–64.
105. Id. at 64. “‘Conviction’ means any of the following accepted and
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Thus, “[t]he second prosecution for the same offense violated the
Double Jeopardy Clause and must be set aside, unless . . . Jeffries
forfeited his double-jeopardy claim” by entering a second guilty
106
plea.
The court decided the forfeiture issue in the face of
conflicting precedent. Minnesota precedent indicated that double
jeopardy constituted an affirmative defense, which was forfeited if
107
not raised. Conversely, U.S. Supreme Court precedent preserved
a defendant’s ability to raise a double-jeopardy claim on appeal,
108
even if the defendant entered a counseled guilty plea.
The
Minnesota Supreme Court overruled state precedent and
109
concluded that Menna was binding.
The court held that “a
counseled guilty plea does not bar a defendant from raising a
double-jeopardy claim on appeal if that claim can be decided on
110
the existing record at the time the defendant pleads guilty.”
The court determined that Jeffries’s double-jeopardy claim
could be decided on the existing record and the claim was not
111
forfeited by his second counseled guilty plea. The court reversed
the conviction based on Jeffries’s second guilty plea, reinstated the
initial plea, and remanded the case to the trial court for
112
resentencing pursuant to the first plea agreement.
IV. ANALYSIS
The analysis that follows argues that the court erred in holding
that the unconditional acceptance at the first plea hearing barred
the subsequent vacation of the guilty plea. First, this section
discusses when guilty pleas should implicate double-jeopardy
concerns and whether the situation in Jeffries warranted such
concerns. Then, this section argues that the policy of accuracy
must be weighed against the policy of finality, especially in
113
domestic violence cases involving high risks to victim safety and
recorded by the court: (1) a plea of guilty; or (2) a verdict of guilty by a jury or a
finding of guilty by the court.” MINN. STAT. § 609.02, subdiv. 5 (2010).
106. Jeffries, 806 N.W.2d at 64.
107. State ex rel. Boswell v. Tahash, 278 Minn. 408, 415, 154 N.W.2d 813,
817–18 (1967).
108. Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 (1975).
109. Jeffries, 806 N.W.2d at 65.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 65–66.
113. RANA SAMPSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING
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114

offender recidivism.
The analysis of the double-jeopardy issue
concludes by suggesting the court should allow judges to vacate
115
guilty pleas when it is “fair and just to do so.”
This section ends
by supporting the court’s holding that a defendant cannot forfeit a
double-jeopardy claim by pleading guilty when the Double
Jeopardy Clause prohibits the State from bringing the defendant
116
into court in the first place.
A.

When Guilty Pleas Implicate Double-Jeopardy Concerns

In Ricketts v. Adamson, the U.S. Supreme Court discussed
attachment of jeopardy in guilty pleas, but the situation in Ricketts
differed from Jeffries because Jeffries had not been sentenced yet
117
and had not begun to serve a sentence. Thus, Jeffries required the
Minnesota Supreme Court to decide the issue of when jeopardy
attaches prior to sentencing.
The majority in Jeffries erred by simply determining whether
118
the trial court convicted Jeffries at the first plea hearing.
The
court should have questioned whether that conviction barred the
119
The court’s
trial court from later vacating the plea agreement.
opinion promoted the policy of finality, but the Jeffries decision will
have a negative impact on the accuracy of sentences in future cases.
The standard applied to defendants’ motions to withdraw guilty
120
pleas should also apply to trial judges’ decisions to vacate guilty
pleas.

SERVS., PROBLEM-ORIENTED GUIDES FOR POLICE PROBLEM-SPECIFIC GUIDES SERIES NO.
45: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 1 (2007), available at http://www.cops.usdoj.gov
/Publications/e12061550.pdf (“[D]omestic violence accounts for about 20
percent of the nonfatal violent crime women experience.”).
114. Id. at 24 (“[F]or the most part, recidivism remains high.”).
115. Extending the standard set forth in MINN. R. CRIM. P. 15.05, subdiv. 2.
116. Jeffries, 806 N.W.2d at 65 (overruling state precedent and adopting
Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 (1975)).
117. Compare Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1, 3 (1987) (explaining that the
defendant “had been sentenced, and had begun serving a term of
imprisonment”), with Jeffries, 806 N.W.2d at 59 (describing that the judge indicated
he would no longer accept the plea agreement prior to sentencing).
118. Jeffries, 806 N.W.2d at 64.
119. Id. at 71 (Gildea, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that a defendant’s conduct
can continue jeopardy in a proceeding, even if convicted, if he consents to the
vacation of his guilty plea and the continuation of the proceedings).
120. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 15.05, subdiv. 2 (articulating that defendants may
withdraw their guilty pleas prior to sentencing if it would be “fair and just to do
so”).
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Jeopardy must attach in order to bar a second prosecution of
121
The Minnesota Supreme Court recently held
the same offense.
that a conviction occurs at the time the trial court accepts a guilty
122
plea and adjudicates guilt on the record.
In that case, the court
concluded, “[I]t would be anomalous to treat a conviction . . .
123
differently than an acquittal.”
The court has held that an
acquittal cannot be subject to appeal, even if erroneous, because
124
Therefore, the
the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits retrial.
court has said a conviction carries similar weight as acquittals in
125
double-jeopardy cases.
But there are many ways that convictions through plea
negotiations are treated differently than acquittals. Defendants can
withdraw their pleas prior to sentencing when it is “fair and just to
126
127
do so.”
Defendants can appeal their convictions.
Various
jurisdictions have come to different conclusions regarding when
128
jeopardy attaches in plea deals, while every jurisdiction affords
129
As the First Circuit Court of
the same standard to acquittals.
121. Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 325 (1984).
122. State v. Martinez-Mendoza, 804 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Minn. 2011). But see United
States v. Combs, 634 F.2d 1295, 1298 (10th Cir. 1980) (concluding that a
defendant was not formally convicted until sentencing of an accepted guilty plea).
123. Martinez-Mendoza, 804 N.W.2d at 8 n.9 (explaining that “an acquittal may
be accorded more weight for policy reasons” but that “does not change
the . . . prohibition of a second prosecution for the same offense after
conviction”).
124. State v. Large, 607 N.W.2d 774, 779–80 (Minn. 2000).
125. Martinez-Mendoza, 804 N.W.2d at 8.
126. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 15.05, subdiv. 2. Defendants can also withdraw their
pleas post-sentencing if they show “manifest injustice.” Id. subdiv. 1.
127. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 28.02, subdiv. 2 (stating that a “defendant may appeal as
of right from any adverse final judgment”).
128. Compare United States v. Santiago Soto, 825 F.2d 616, 620 (1st Cir. 1987)
(holding that jeopardy did not attach prior to sentencing), State v. Angel, 51 P.3d
1155, 1157 (N.M. 2002) (stating that “jeopardy did not attach to Defendant’s nocontest plea prior to sentencing”), and State v. Duval, 589 A.2d 321, 325 (Vt. 1991)
(reasoning that a court should be able to erase a plea acceptance in order to
correct a mistake without implicating the Double Jeopardy Clause), with United
States v. Sanchez, 609 F.2d 761, 762 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating that temporary
acceptance did not implicate the Double Jeopardy Clause but that unconditional
acceptance of a guilty plea would), United States v. Cambindo Valencia, 609 F.2d
603, 637 (2d Cir. 1979) (declaring that jeopardy attached once the defendant’s
guilty plea was accepted), and United States v. Bullock, 579 F.2d 1116, 1118 (8th
Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (finding that the events in this case were pretrial
proceedings, not implicating the Double Jeopardy Clause, but stating that
jeopardy would have attached if the plea had been accepted).
129. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795 (1969). The Court quoted
Blackstone,
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Appeals has stated, in a case in which “the judge initially accepted
the guilty plea but then rejected it within the same proceeding,
130
defendant was not placed in jeopardy in any meaningful sense.”
But it is hard to imagine a case in which a judge could acquit a
defendant but then “un-acquit” him in the same proceeding,
without implicating the Double Jeopardy Clause.
The trial court has three options when confronted with a plea
agreement. The court can accept the plea, reject the plea, or
131
conditionally accept the plea. Based on the language used by the
trial court in Jeffries, the Minnesota Supreme Court concluded the
plea was unconditionally accepted and therefore constituted a
132
conviction.
But the use of unconditional language should not
prohibit a fair and just revision of the plea agreement, based on
133
troublesome information contained in the PSI.
In State v. Duval, the Vermont Supreme Court concluded that
“the rule is only that jeopardy ‘generally’ attaches at the time of
134
acceptance of the guilty plea,” but that the rule has exceptions.
The court described the issue in Duval as “much narrower and
simpler” than typical double-jeopardy issues, phrasing it as
135
“whether the court ought be able to correct a mistake.”
The
Minnesota Supreme Court should have recognized the same
difference in Jeffries.
[G]iven the false assumptions preceding the “acceptance”
of the plea, the acceptance should have no more legal
significance than the mistake that led to it. The court
“[T]he plea of autrefoits acquit, or a former acquittal,” he wrote, “is
grounded on this universal maxim of the common law of England, that
no man is to be brought into jeopardy of his life more than once for the
same offence.” Today, every State incorporates some form of the
prohibition in its constitution or common law.
Id.
130. Santiago Soto, 825 F.2d at 620. Jeffries differs from Santiago Soto because the
judge did not accept and then reject the plea agreement within the same hearing,
but the First Circuit did not require acceptance and rejection to be during the
same hearing, only before the sentencing hearing. See id.
131. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 15.04, subdiv. 3(1). “When a plea is entered and the
defendant questioned, the trial court judge must reject or accept the plea of guilty
on the terms of the plea agreement. The court may postpone its acceptance or
rejection until it has received the results of a pre-sentence investigation.” Id.
132. State v. Jeffries, 806 N.W.2d 56, 63 (Minn. 2011).
133. Id. at 59–60. The trial court accepted the guilty plea and said Jeffries was
convicted of felony domestic assault, but then the court ordered a pre-sentence
investigation and continued the matter for sentencing. Id. at 59.
134. 589 A.2d 321, 324 (Vt. 1991).
135. Id. at 325.
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simply corrected the mistake by erasing the plea
acceptance and proceeded to treat the case as it should
136
have been treated from the outset.
The Vermont Supreme Court made the policy decision “to
encourage more probing by judges and to allow reasonable room
137
to correct mistakes.”
If the Minnesota Supreme Court had ruled that a judge could
vacate a guilty plea for fair and just reasons, then jeopardy would
not have attached, the proceeding would have continued, and an
appropriate sentence would have resulted.
1.

Convictions: Courts Must Balance Finality Against Accuracy
138

Finality is an important policy that courts must guard closely.
139
An
But it is not an absolute rule, especially in plea negotiations.
exception to the finality rule is a defendant’s right to withdraw a
140
guilty plea.
Also, a conviction may not concern finality if a trial
court accepts a guilty plea but imposes conditions on the defendant
prior to sentencing. If a defendant fails to comply with a condition,
the State has “the authority to vacate the underlying conviction.
Once the underlying conviction has been vacated, the defendant is
in the same position as if the conviction had been reversed on
141
appeal.”
Neither the State nor Jeffries relied on the finality of the plea
142
agreement, even though the court accepted the plea and said,
143
“[Y]ou are convicted.” Both parties agreed that if Jeffries violated
144
145
One
the conditions of his release, the deal would be off.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Creekpaum, supra note 25, at 1190.
139. See United States v. Santiago Soto, 825 F.2d 616, 620 (1st Cir. 1987);
Duval, 589 A.2d at 325.
140. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 15.05.
141. THOMAS, supra note 20, at 224; see, e.g., Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1
(1987).
142. State v. Jeffries, 806 N.W.2d 56, 74–75 (Minn. 2011) (Anderson, G. Barry,
J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 59.
144. Jeffries’s conditions included appearing for PSI meetings, giving
information to the probation officer, and appearing for sentencing. Id.
145. Id. The attorneys disagreed about what would happen if Jeffries failed to
comply with his conditions, but they both agreed that the deal would change. Id.
The court referenced the prosecutor’s statement, “[D]efendant’s appearance at
sentencing and his cooperation with the [(PSI)] is a condition of the deal” and
the defense’s reply, “[I]f the deal is off, then the deal should be off.” Id.
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condition of Jeffries’s release prior to sentencing was to attend
146
which
appointments related to completing the PSI report,
compiles information influential to determining an appropriate
147
sentence.
The rules should “provide that a trial judge error—
even one in the defendant’s favor—can be reversed . . . . The game
need not end—jeopardy may continue—until an error-free result is
148
obtained.”
Decisions regarding when jeopardy attaches “represent a
149
policy choice” between finality and accuracy.
This case note
150
Chief
argues that courts must balance finality with accuracy.
Justice Gildea correctly favored accuracy over finality in her
dissenting opinion, stating that the trial court had the “discretion
to withdraw its acceptance of a guilty plea once it learned of
additional information about Jeffries’s criminal history that caused
the court to believe the plea agreement was not in the interest of
151
justice.”
The rules provide that a court “may accept a plea
agreement of the parties when the interest of justice would be
152
served.”
Also, precedent indicates that an agreement that “‘is
injurious to the interests of the public or contravenes some
153
The court’s authority to
established interest of society’ is void.”
determine whether a plea agreement promotes justice should
154
continue even after the court accepts a plea agreement.
Accuracy promotes justice; a court must have discretion to correct

146. Id. at 75 (Anderson, G. Barry, J., dissenting).
147. MINN. STAT. § 609.2244, subdiv. 1 (2010) requires a PSI when a defendant
is convicted of a domestic violence-related offense as described in MINN. STAT.
§ 518B.01, subdiv. 2.
148. Amar, supra note 6, at 1841.
149. Creekpaum, supra note 25, at 1184.
150. See id. at 1187–88 (advocating for a “framework of accuracy and finality,
with the goal of maximizing the gain accorded accuracy while minimizing the
violence inflicted on finality”).
151. Jeffries, 806 N.W.2d at 71 (Gildea, C.J., dissenting).
152. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 15.04, subdiv. 3(2).
153. State v. Martinez-Mendoza, 804 N.W.2d 1, 16 (Minn. 2011) (Anderson, G.
Barry, J., dissenting) (quoting Isles Wellness, Inc. v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 725
N.W.2d 90, 92–93 (Minn. 2006) (discussing contracts void for public policy
violations)); see also Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689–90 (1949) (demonstrating
that courts have the authority to prohibit a jury from giving a certain verdict when
“the ends of public justice would . . . be defeated”).
154. Martinez-Mendoza, 804 N.W.2d at 14 (Gildea, C.J., dissenting) (stating that
if the court gains new information, which leads the court to believe that the
interests of justice are not served by the plea deal, the court may withdraw its
acceptance).
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155

an inappropriate plea agreement, prior to sentencing.
Some courts have decided that jeopardy does not attach when
acceptance of a guilty plea is based on inaccurate information
156
about prior convictions, misinformation about the facts of a
157
or a misunderstanding about the terms of the plea
plea,
158
agreement.
These courts recognize that accuracy must prevail
over finality in situations involving erroneous plea agreements.
2.

Accuracy Is Particularly Important in Domestic Assault Cases

Accuracy in judgments and appropriateness of sentences are
essential in domestic violence cases, where criminal history is
159
particularly important.
Legal interventions are necessary to
break the cycle of abuse, because domestic violence is likely to
continue and escalate if law enforcement and the justice system do
160
not respond and hold offenders accountable.
“Unlike
participants in a barroom brawl or street skirmish, perpetrators of
domestic violence present a particularly high risk for continuing,
even escalating violence against the complainant as they seek
161
further control over her choices and actions.”
Domestic abusers are more likely to re-offend than other types
162
of perpetrators. “Domestic violence is the number one source of
injury to women in the United States, ‘causing more injuries than
155. Cf. State v. Robledo-Kinney, 615 N.W.2d 25, 32 (Minn. 2000) (holding
that when a plea agreement is based on a mutual mistake of fact, the plea may be
withdrawn).
156. E.g., State v. Burris, 40 S.W.3d 520, 526–27 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000).
157. E.g., Gilmore v. Zimmerman, 793 F.2d 564, 569–70 (3d Cir. 1986).
158. E.g., State v. Angel, 51 P.3d 1155, 1157 (N.M. 2002); State v. Duval, 589
A.2d 321, 324 (Vt. 1991).
159. See WATCH, PROMOTING VICTIM SAFETY AND OFFENDER ACCOUNTABILITY:
IMPROVING THE RESPONSE TO MISDEMEANOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES 9 (2011),
available at http://www.watchmn.org/sites/default/files/Suburban%20FINAL.pdf
(describing domestic violence as “a repeated pattern of abuse used to control an
intimate partner,” which indicates a high likelihood of repeat offenses).
160. Id. at 1. “Domestic violence is a crime that more often than not escalates
without intervention and how the justice system responds to initial assaults and
calls for help can significantly impact whether or not battering will continue or be
deterred.” Id.
161. Judith S. Kaye & Susan K. Knipps, Judicial Responses to Domestic Violence: The
Case for a Problem Solving Approach, 27 W. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 4 (2000).
162. Id. at 4 n.10 (“The recidivism rate for crimes of violence between
intimates is two and one-half times that for violence between strangers.” (citing
Elena Salzman, The Quincy District Court Domestic Violence Prevention Program: A Model
Legal Framework for Domestic Violence Intervention, 74 B.U. L. REV. 329, 344 n.83
(1994))).
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163

rapes, auto accidents and muggings combined.’”
Regardless of
these safety risks, sentences for domestic assaults remain lenient
relative to other crimes such as controlled substance or DUI
164
offenses.
165
166
When men choose to
Battering is a learned behavior.
batter and face no consequences for their actions, they will
167
continue the behavior that works.
Every year the Minnesota
Coalition for Battered Women issues a Femicide Report,
documenting the deaths caused by domestic violence in
168
Minnesota.
In the 2011 report, the Coalition made this decree:
“When mistakes are made, people can and do lose their lives. The
stakes are too high for us to get it wrong. We must prioritize
169
safety.”
Chief Judge of the State of New York and Chief Judge of the
New York Court of Appeals, Judith S. Kaye, along with her
colleague Susan K. Knipps, advocates for judicial officers to take a
problem-solving approach when confronted with domestic violence
170
cases.
“If we handle them inadequately, tragedies occur. Lives
163. Id. at 3 (quoting Tonya McCormick, Note and Comment, Convicting
Domestic Violence Abusers When the Victim Remains Silent, 13 BYU J. PUB. L. 427, 428
(1999)).
164. CAROLINE BETTINGER-LOPEZ ET AL., VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN THE
UNITED STATES AND THE STATE’S OBLIGATION TO PROTECT: CIVIL SOCIETY BRIEFING
PAPERS ON COMMUNITY, MILITARY AND CUSTODY 52 (2011), available at
http://www.law.virginia.edu/vaw (“Yet, sentences––even for recidivist batterers––
remain relatively lenient. The results of those light dispositions may greatly
endanger victims.” (footnote omitted) (citing Cynthia D. Cook, Triggered: Targeting
Domestic Violence Offenders in California, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 328, 333 (2000))).
165. MINN. COAL. FOR BATTERED WOMEN, HANDBOOK FOR ELECTED OFFICIALS ON
BATTERED WOMEN’S ISSUES 11 (2006) [hereinafter HANDBOOK], available at
http://www.mcbw.org/files/u1/Elected_Official_Handbook.pdf. The definition
of “batter” is “to beat with successive blows so as to bruise, shatter, or demolish; . . .
to subject to strong, overwhelming, or repeated attack; . . . to strike heavily and
repeatedly.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 104 (11th ed. 2003).
166. Women batter as well, but the vast majority of abusers are male. See
HANDBOOK, supra note 165, at 8 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF JUSTICE
PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SELECTED FINDINGS: VIOLENCE BETWEEN
INTIMATES (1994) (“90–95% of domestic violence victims are women.”)).
167. Id. at 11. “Men use physical, emotional, and/or sexual abuse to maintain
power and control over their relationships with their female partners. They have
learned that violence works to achieve this end.” Id.
168. At least thirty-four people died as a result of domestic violence in 2011 in
Minnesota. MINN. COAL. FOR BATTERED WOMEN, FEMICIDE REPORT 3 (2011)
[hereinafter FEMICIDE REPORT], available at http://www.mcbw.org/files/images
/2011_Femicide_Report_FINAL_1.pdf.
169. Id. at 18.
170. Kaye & Knipps, supra note 161, at 5–6.
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are lost. And public confidence in our justice system moves down
yet another notch. If we refuse to take action, refuse to change, we
171
may preserve our traditions and decorum. But at what cost?”
Coming to a simplistic conclusion that an acceptance of a
guilty plea constitutes a conviction, thus barring a subsequent reevaluation of a plea agreement, does nothing to solve the problem
of domestic violence and fails to promote victim safety, offender
172
accountability, or public confidence in our criminal system. The
Jeffries decision will force trial courts to inadequately handle
domestic violence cases in the future.
Prosecutors, law
enforcement, and victim advocates are keenly aware that program
intervention and appropriate sentences can encourage
rehabilitation, increase safety for the victim, and lead to a more
173
effective justice system.
Accurate sentences must be treated as a
174
matter of public concern and safety, especially in cases where the
judge recognizes that an abuser will not be successful on
175
probation. Allowing a judge to vacate a guilty plea in this type of
situation, despite his use of unconditional language in accepting
the plea, furthers the public safety goals of reducing domestic
violence in our community. The Minnesota Supreme Court’s
decision does not further this goal.
3.

Pre-Sentence Investigations Are Valuable Resources

The trial court in Jeffries relied on the information in the PSI to
evaluate the appropriateness of the sentence contained in the plea
176
Courts should have the discretion to change an
agreement.
inappropriate sentence after learning new information from the
177
PSI.

171. Id. at 12.
172. Id.
173. See SAMPSON, supra note 113, at 26–28 (discussing the benefits of a
“graded response” to domestic violence).
174. See HANDBOOK, supra note 165, at 8–9, for a statistical illustration of the
impact domestic violence has on the public.
175. State v. Jeffries, 806 N.W.2d 56, 59–60 (Minn. 2011) (quoting the judge
explaining on the record his reasons for no longer accepting the plea agreement).
176. Id. at 75 (Anderson, G. Barry, J., dissenting) (pointing out that the trial
court based its decision to vacate the guilty plea on information in the PSI).
177. Id. at 71 (Gildea, C.J., dissenting); see Carl Edman & Cynthia E. Richman,
Double Jeopardy, 89 GEO. L.J. 1439, 1478 (2001) (explaining that a post-conviction
sentence can be modified if “the defendant has no legitimate expectation of
finality in the original sentence”).
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The intent of the statute requiring a PSI in domestic violence
178
cases is to recognize the importance of accurate sentences in
these types of cases where repeat offenses and escalating violence
179
are not only common but predicted and expected.
As the court
of appeals has stated, “[A]ny behavior indicating an individual’s
180
propensity for violence is related to domestic violence.”
A study on the handling of misdemeanor domestic violence
cases in the suburban Hennepin County courts found that, in some
cases, pre-sentence investigations were not ordered until after
181
sentencing.
“Conducting a PSI after sentencing minimizes its
importance, disregards victim input, and makes revocations
difficult. As one probation officer put it, this practice is akin to a
182
doctor writing a prescription without an exam.”
For the same
reason, a judge should not be able to lock in a certain sentence—
regardless of the language used at the plea hearing—because the
183
plea hearing takes place prior to ordering the PSI.
The Jeffries
decision will result in a practice akin to doctors not being able to
change the prescriptions they wrote after receiving the results of
the exam.
184
The Minnesota Court Information System (MNCIS)
indicates that Erik Jeffries was convicted of misdemeanor domestic
185
186
assault in 2006.
The original complaint in that case charged
187
Later in
Jeffries with felony domestic assault by strangulation.
178. MINN. STAT. § 609.2244 (2010).
179. WATCH, supra note 159, at 1.
180. State v. Moen, 752 N.W.2d 532, 535 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008).
181. WATCH, supra note 159, at 12.
182. Id.
183. MINN. STAT. § 609.2244, subdiv. 1 (requiring a PSI for defendants
convicted of a domestic violence-related offense, therefore making it impossible to
order a PSI prior to acceptance of a guilty plea).
184. The Minnesota court website offers public access to statewide electronic
case records and the calendar management system. MINN. JUD. BRANCH, MINN.
COURT INFO. SYS., http://www.mncourts.gov/publicaccess (last visited Sept. 16,
2012) [hereinafter MNCIS].
185. MNCIS, supra note 184 (read through “Required Acknowledgement”;
then click “I Accept”; then select “Criminal/Traffic/Petty Case Records”; then
provide the required “CAPTCHA” security authorization and case number 27-CR
-06-057311; then click “search”).
186. Complaint for State v. Jeffries, No. 27-CR-06-057311 (Aug. 22, 2006) (on
file at the WATCH office).
187. MINN. STAT. § 609.2247 (2010). Passed in 2005, this statute made
domestic assault by strangulation a felony-level offense because “[p]rior to the
law’s passage, most domestic strangulation cases were charged as misdemeanors
even though strangulation is one of the most dangerous forms of domestic
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2006, Jeffries was again convicted of domestic assault, enhanced to
a gross misdemeanor because of the prior domestic-qualified
188
conviction.
Jeffries violated his conditions of probation in this
189
Also in 2007,
case and a revocation hearing was held in 2007.
Jeffries was convicted of disorderly conduct, and upon closer review
of the MNCIS report, that case was originally charged as a violation
190
of an order for protection as well as disorderly conduct.
These are just some examples of what the judge may have
learned upon reviewing the PSI that were unknown at the time of
the acceptance of the first plea agreement. These examples do not
191
A
include Jeffries’s other felony and misdemeanor convictions.
violence and, according to the Hennepin County Fatality Review and other
experts, is frequently a precursor to domestic homicide.” HEATHER WOLFGRAM,
WATCH, THE IMPACT OF MINNESOTA’S FELONY STRANGULATION LAW 2 (2007)
(footnote
omitted),
available
at
http://www.watchmn.org/files/reports
/Strangulation%20cover%20final%201-24-07.pdf. “All batterers should be viewed
as potentially lethal, though there are well-documented indicators of lethality of
which everyone should be aware. Included in the factors that have been identified
as possible lethality indicators [is] . . . attempted strangulation.” FEMICIDE REPORT,
supra note 168, at 6.
188. MNCIS, supra note 184 (read through “Required Acknowledgement”;
then click “I Accept”; then select “Criminal/Traffic/Petty Case Records”; then
provide the required “CAPTCHA” security authorization and case number 27-CR
-06-083944; then click “search”). “Whoever violates subdivision 1 within ten years
of a previous qualified domestic violence-related offense conviction . . . is guilty of
a gross misdemeanor.” MINN. STAT. § 609.2242, subdiv. 2 (2010).
189. MNCIS, supra note 184 (read through “Required Acknowledgement”;
then click “I Accept”; then select “Criminal/Traffic/Petty Case Records”; then
provide the required “CAPTCHA” security authorization and case number 27-CR
-06-083944; then click “search”).
190. MNCIS, supra note 184 (read through “Required Acknowledgement”;
then click “I Accept”; then select “Criminal/Traffic/Petty Case Records”; then
provide the required “CAPTCHA” security authorization and case number 27-CR
-07-026258; then click “search”). An order for protection is a civil order granting
the petitioner relief from domestic violence in the form of no physical harm, no
contact, and/or coordination of supervised child visitation, among other
protective conditions. If the order is violated, it is a criminal offense. MINN. STAT.
§ 518B.01, subdiv. 4, 6, 14 (2010).
191. In addition to the domestic violence-related offenses, Jeffries was also
convicted of the following (listed are only convictions on the public MNCIS record
for Hennepin County, Minnesota): four counts of felony controlled substance
crime in the fifth degree—possession (Case No. 27-CR-98-064348, 27-CR-99094531, 27-CR-00-067377, and 27-CR-03-058933); one count of felony sale of
simulated controlled substance (Case No. 27-CR-02-056290); one count of felony
forgery (Case No. 27-CR-06-041788); five counts of misdemeanor trespass (Case
No. 27-CR-97-110680, 27-CR-98-032484, 27-CR-00-044706, 27-CR-02-095768, and
27-CR-03-081437); one count of misdemeanor loitering with intent to buy or sell
narcotics (Case No. 27-CR-98-043356); and one count of misdemeanor disorderly
conduct (Case No. 27-CR-99-085929). According to MNCIS, throughout these

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol39/iss1/13

22

Light: Criminal Law: The Tension between Finality and Accuracy: Double J

328

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:1

defendant that seemingly has two prior misdemeanor domestic
assaults looks very different than a defendant with three cases
involving possibly serious domestic violence (including
strangulation and violation of an order for protection), as well as
numerous misdemeanor and felony convictions spanning a decade.
The judge failed to defer his acceptance of the plea agreement on
the record, but that does not mean a convicted felon and chronic
domestic abuser should be sentenced to a probationary sentence
that was accepted based on incomplete information at the plea
hearing.
The importance of PSIs should make it impossible for judges
to lock themselves into a plea agreement without first reviewing the
192
PSI.
To do otherwise, such as the ruling in Jeffries, is to render
the PSI worthless. The judge acted for fair and just reasons when
he vacated the guilty plea because he knew he could not properly
adhere to the previously accepted probationary sentence after
learning the extent of Jeffries’s criminal history in the PSI.
4.

The Court Should View a Judge’s Right to Vacate a Guilty Plea
the Same as a Defendant’s Right to Withdraw a Guilty Plea

The trial court vacated Jeffries’s plea agreement in an effort to
rectify an inappropriate sentence, because the PSI indicated that
193
It would
Jeffries would not have been successful on probation.
have been more appropriate for the court to explain on the record
cases, there were seven probation violations hearings (this number does not
account for every violation, just the violations that resulted in a hearing before the
court). See MNCIS, supra note 184 (read through “Required Acknowledgement”;
then click “I Accept”; then select “Criminal/Traffic/Petty Case Records”; then
provide the required “CAPTCHA” security authorization and one of the cited case
numbers; then click “search”).
192. PSIs include sections recommending sentences and treatment for
defendants. MINN. STAT. § 609.2244, subdiv. 2 (2010).
193. State v. Jeffries, 806 N.W.2d 56, 60 (Minn. 2011). According to the State,
Jeffries’s criminal history included eight prior felony and eleven gross
misdemeanor or misdemeanor convictions. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 101,
at 2. Jeffries also violated his conditional release twice before his first sentencing
hearing and then again by having contact with the victim prior to the second plea
agreement. Id. Jeffries was also charged in 2009 with four counts of felony-level
violations of a no-contact order that were dismissed when Jeffries was sentenced to
his executed sixty-month sentence on the felony domestic assault case. See MNCIS,
supra note 184 (read through “Required Acknowledgement”; then click “I Accept”;
then select “Criminal/Traffic/Petty Case Records”; then provide the required
“CAPTCHA” security authorization and case number 27-CR-09-5620; then click
“search”).
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that it would not go along with the negotiated sentence and give
Jeffries a choice whether to withdraw his plea or to continue with
194
sentencing.
This case note recognizes the poor choice of words
used by the trial court when it said Jeffries was “convicted” at the
195
But the trial court’s inaccurate word usage should
plea hearing.
not result in an inaccurate sentence for a defendant guilty of felony
domestic assault. Nor should the trial court be barred from
correcting an inaccurate sentence when faced with new
information about multiple prior convictions and probation
violations—indicating high risks for recidivism and victim safety.
Prior to sentencing, a defendant has a right to withdraw his or
her guilty plea if the trial court determines it is “fair and just to do
196
so.”
After sentencing, the court must allow a defendant to
withdraw a guilty plea if “necessary to correct a manifest
197
injustice.” The fair and just standard is a lower standard than the
198
manifest injustice standard, but “it does not allow a defendant to
199
Requiring a fair
withdraw a guilty plea ‘for simply any reason.’”
and just reason promotes the policies of finality as well as accuracy.
Not allowing defendants to back out of a plea for just any reason
promotes finality of judgments, while allowing room to withdraw
200
guilty pleas for fair and just reasons promotes the policy of
accuracy in sentences.
In 1987, the Minnesota Supreme Court reiterated, “[I]f an
unqualified promise is made on the sentence to be imposed, a
194. See State v. Wolske, 280 Minn. 465, 473, 160 N.W.2d 146, 152 (1968)
(“[I]n the event the agreement is not fulfilled by the prosecutor or not acceptable
to the court, the defendant should be afforded the option of either withdrawing
or reaffirming his plea . . . .”).
195. Jeffries, 806 N.W.2d at 59.
196. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 15.05, subdiv. 2 (“In its discretion the court may allow
the defendant to withdraw a plea at any time before sentence if it is fair and just to
do so. The court must give due consideration to the reasons advanced by the
defendant in support of the motion and any prejudice the granting of the motion
would cause the prosecution by reason of actions taken in reliance upon the
defendant’s plea.”).
197. Id. subdiv. 1.
198. The fact that it is easier for a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea before
sentencing rather than after indicates that acceptance of a guilty plea does not
carry the same level of finality as a sentence.
199. State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 646 (Minn. 2007) (quoting State v.
Farnsworth, 738 N.W.2d 364, 372 (Minn. 2007)).
200. For example, a fair and just reason to allow withdrawal of a guilty plea
would be if the parties agreed to, and the court accepted, an unfair or unjust
sentence, before review of all of the information. See State v. Kunshier, 410
N.W.2d 377, 379 n.1 (Minn. 1987).
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defendant should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea if that
201
The trial court in Jeffries promised to
promise is not fulfilled.”
impose the agreed-upon sentence pursuant to the plea deal when it
202
accepted the guilty plea at the first plea hearing.
When the trial
court later indicated that it was not willing to impose that
203
sentence, it did not fulfill its promise, thus allowing Jeffries to
204
withdraw his guilty plea.
Acceptance of plea agreements is not final because defendants
“do not forfeit their right to withdraw those pleas of guilty and
stand trial if, because of later events, the trial court or the
prosecution ethically change their minds about previous
205
agreements that were reached.” In cases such as this, the result is
the same regardless of whether the judge vacates the plea because
it is fair and just to do so (instead of imposing a sentence the
defendant had not contemplated when pleading guilty) or whether
the judge gives the defendant the option to withdraw his plea
because the judge has the sole discretion to determine whether
206
withdrawal would be fair and just.
The Connecticut Supreme Court has held that double
jeopardy does not attach when a defendant does not have a
201. Id. at 379 (citing State v. Trott, 338 N.W.2d 248, 252 (Minn. 1983);
Kochevar v. State, 281 N.W.2d 680, 687 (Minn. 1979)); see also Santobello v. New
York, 404 U.S. 257, 262–63 (1971) (stating that when the prosecution fails to keep
a promise with regard to an accepted plea agreement, the case should be
remanded to the trial court to determine whether specific performance of the
agreement or withdrawal of the plea best serves the interests of justice); Olness v.
State, 290 Minn. 198, 202, 186 N.W.2d 706, 709 (1971) (“Although a plea of guilty
may be set aside where an unqualified promise is made as part of a plea bargain
and is thereafter dishonored, a plea of guilty should not be set aside merely
because the accused has not achieved his unwarranted hope.”).
202. State v. Jeffries, 806 N.W.2d 56, 59 (Minn. 2011).
203. Id. at 59–60.
204. The court has previously explained:
Trial judges at sentencing even have the right to change their minds
about a previous plea agreement they earlier deemed acceptable. For
instance, a presentence investigation may turn up facts unknown to all
parties. The point is that, whenever a defendant has pleaded guilty
pursuant to his understanding that there is a plea bargain as to the
charges or to the ultimate sentence, the defendant must be offered the
right to withdraw that plea of guilty and stand trial if, for any reason, the
trial judge exercises the discretion that is his not to follow the proposed
agreement.
Kunshier, 410 N.W.2d at 379 n.1.
205. Id. at 380 (citing State v. Wolske, 280 Minn. 465, 474--75, 160 N.W.2d 146,
153 (1968)).
206. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 15.05, subdiv. 2 (2010).
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reasonable expectation of finality in the plea agreement because
207
his sentence is conditioned on review of the PSI and victim input.
The Connecticut rules of practice allow a trial court to vacate an
accepted plea agreement based on new information within a PSI
and impose a different sentence or offer the defendant the choice
208
to withdraw his plea.
The court reasoned that plea agreements
often do not involve “the kind of prosecutorial overreaching that
the double jeopardy clause was designed to prevent” if the State did
not break the plea agreement after gaining a benefit or if a second
209
prosecution did not start anew.
This reasoning aligns with the
continuing jeopardy principle, which is based on a combination of
interests, including “fairness to society, lack of finality, and limited
210
waiver.”
When a defendant withdraws a plea, the same jeopardy
continues and the defendant is not at risk of twice being put in
211
jeopardy.
If the court had Jeffries withdraw his plea on the
212
record, instead of saying “I’m giving your pleas back,” then
jeopardy would have continued and double-jeopardy concerns
would not have been implicated. But the result is the same and the
policies the Double Jeopardy Clause seeks to protect were not at
213
risk. By vacating the guilty plea, the court did not subject Jeffries
to two trials, two sentences, or two punishments.
5.

Advocating for an Alternative Rule: Extending the Fair and
Just Standard

The rules should allow judges to vacate a defendant’s guilty
214
plea when it is “fair and just to do so,” extending the standard
207. State v. Thomas, 995 A.2d 65, 76–77 (Conn. 2010). See generally Mark L.
Hammond, Note, United States v. Patterson: When Does the Double Jeopardy Clause
Protect Defendants in Federal Court?, 29 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 467, 470–74 (2005).
208. Thomas, 995 A.2d at 77 n.14.
209. Id. at 78; see also LAFAVE, supra note 33, § 25.1(d) n.68.
210. Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 329 n.4 (1970) (discussing Green v. United
States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957); Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904)).
211. See Smith v. Phillips, No. 02–CV–6329, 2012 WL 1340070, at *9 (E.D.N.Y.
Apr. 17, 2012) (citing United States v. Olmeda, 461 F.3d 271, 279 n.7 (2d Cir.
2006); United States v. Podde, 105 F.3d 813, 816–17 (2d Cir. 1997)); see also
Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1, 11 (1987) (“[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause . . .
does not relieve a defendant from the consequences of his voluntary choice.”
(quoting United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 98–99 (1978))).
212. State v. Jeffries, 806 N.W.2d 56, 60 (Minn. 2011).
213. See supra notes 25–28 and accompanying text.
214. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 15.05, subdiv. 2.
For an explanation of the
requirements of the fair and just standard, see State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 97
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applied to defendants’ motions for plea withdrawal prior to
215
When the information in the PSI indicated Jeffries
sentencing.
216
would not be successful on probation, the judge’s decision to no
longer adhere to the agreed-upon plea deal was appropriate in the
217
Knowing that the
interests of safety, accountability, and justice.
sentence, which Jeffries relied upon in pleading guilty, would
218
change, the judge fairly and justly vacated Jeffries’s guilty plea.
The fair and just standard maintains the finality principle at
219
the heart of the Double Jeopardy Clause,
yet allows for
maximizing the accuracy of sentences in plea agreements by
allowing the judge to change a sentence or vacate a guilty plea
220
when necessary in the interests of fairness and justice.
If this
were the standard, when the judge vacated the guilty plea because
of the information in the PSI, it would have been a fair and just
action, allowing for continuation of the same jeopardy and
therefore not implicating double-jeopardy concerns.
Requiring judges to adhere to a fair and just standard
promotes finality by not allowing judges to simply change their
minds after a defendant may have relied on a particular agreement
221
when pleading guilty.
But it also encourages judges to impose
accurate, appropriate, and just sentences after review of the PSI.
This standard would better serve future cases concerning plea
agreements.

(Minn. 2010) (“The ‘fair and just’ standard requires district courts to give ‘due
consideration’ to two factors: (1) the reasons a defendant advances to support
withdrawal and (2) prejudice granting the motion would cause the State given
reliance on the plea.”).
215. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 15.05, subdiv. 2.
216. Jeffries, 806 N.W.2d at 60.
217. See supra Part IV.A.2 for a discussion of the importance of accountability
in domestic violence cases. The Minnesota Supreme Court should have held that
the trial judge can vacate a guilty plea when it is for a fair and just reason, such as
ensuring appropriate sentences for repeat domestic abusers.
218. Jeffries, 806 N.W.2d at 60.
219. See Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 33 (1978) and Green v. United States, 355 U.S.
184, 188 (1957), for the U.S. Supreme Court’s articulation of the finality policy.
220. See Creekpaum, supra note 25, at 1188 (“A system of justice has no
credibility without accuracy.”); id. at 1190 (“The acceptable level of accuracy will
always be a value judgment, and it can only be achieved in balance with a
competing value: finality.”).
221. See State v. Lopez, 794 N.W.2d 379, 382 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011) (stating
that “more than a change of heart is needed to withdraw a guilty plea”); see also
Kim v. State, 434 N.W.2d 263, 266 (Minn. 1989) (discussing the need to protect
the integrity of guilty pleas).
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Entering a Guilty Plea Does Not Forfeit a Double-Jeopardy Plea

In State ex rel. Boswell v. Tahash, the Minnesota Supreme Court
held that double jeopardy was an affirmative defense that was
222
forfeited if not raised at the appropriate time. The U.S. Supreme
Court ruled eight years later, in Menna v. New York, that a guilty
plea does not prohibit a defendant from raising a double-jeopardy
223
claim on appeal.
In Menna, the U.S. Supreme Court reasoned
that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits the government from
convicting a defendant a second time because the government
224
lacks the authority to bring a defendant into court a second time.
Thus, a guilty plea does not bar a double-jeopardy claim when the
225
defendant asserts the right not to be twice put in jeopardy. If the
double-jeopardy claim were valid, it would bar the government
from initiating new proceedings against the defendant, therefore
226
necessitating the defendant’s right to assert such a claim.
On review of the Jeffries case, the Minnesota Court of Appeals
concluded that Menna was not binding on Minnesota courts
because “the scope of waiver by guilty plea is a matter of state law,
227
not federal constitutional law.”
The court of appeals held that
double jeopardy is an affirmative defense that was “waived by
228
The Minnesota
Jeffries’s subsequent counseled plea of guilty.”
Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals’ decision and
229
adopted the Menna rule, concluding that Jeffries did not forfeit
230
his double-jeopardy claim by pleading guilty.
The State argued that Menna was not binding because state law
231
controls procedural issues such as forfeiture.
The U.S. Supreme
222. 278 Minn. 408, 415, 154 N.W.2d 813, 817–18 (1967).
223. 423 U.S. 61, 62 (1975) (per curiam).
224. Id.; see Long v. McCotter, 792 F.2d 1338, 1343 (5th Cir. 1986); Edman &
Richman, supra note 177, at 1475 n.1431.
225. Menna, 423 U.S. at 62.
226. Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30–31 (1974).
227. State v. Jeffries, 787 N.W.2d 654, 660–61 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010), rev’d, 806
N.W.2d 56 (Minn. 2011) (relying on State v. Kelty, 716 N.W.2d 886, 894 (Wis.
2006)).
228. Id. at 661.
229. Menna, 423 U.S. at 62 n.2 (“We simply hold that a plea of guilty to a
charge does not waive a claim that judged on its face the charge is one which the
State may not constitutionally prosecute.”)
230. Jeffries, 806 N.W.2d at 65.
231. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 101, at 17 (citing Danforth v. Minnesota,
552 U.S. 264, 290 (2008)). “[The] state procedural requirement that an appellant
must raise an affirmative defense below or forfeit it for purposes of appeal is a
matter of state law. The Supreme Court’s procedural exception in Menna is
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Court declared in Danforth v. Minnesota, “[T]he availability or
nonavailability of remedies . . . is a mixed question of state and
232
federal law.’”
The State maintained in Jeffries that “Minnesota’s
waiver rule is simply a limit on the availability of a remedy to a
233
litigant, a process left to state law.” Relying on Danforth, the State
advocated that the court view waiver as “a procedural requirement
controlled by state law and distinct from the nature of the right
234
itself.” The State explained in its brief to the court, “[T]he court
of appeals found that the procedural consequences attendant to a
waiver of a constitutional right (as opposed to the existence of a
235
constitutional right) is a matter of state law.”
The State
maintained that the court of appeals correctly held that Jeffries
“waived the benefit of that original deal when he negotiated a new
236
one.”
But the Minnesota Supreme Court agreed with Jeffries’s
interpretation of Menna as not “grounded in waiver, but in the
defendant’s constitutional right not to be haled into court on a
237
charge.”
The U.S. Supreme Court’s reasoning in Blackledge v.
238
In Blackledge, the Court
Perry supports this interpretation.
declared that the defendant could not waive certain due process
rights that go “to the very power of the State to bring the defendant
239
into court.”
Likewise, in Robinson v. Neil, the Court stated,
“[T]his guarantee . . . is a constitutional right of the criminal
defendant [and] its practical result is to prevent a trial from taking
place at all, rather than to prescribe procedural rules that govern
240
the conduct of a trial.”
Thus, the Minnesota Supreme Court
correctly interpreted Menna as a substantive rule based on
241
constitutional and federal law, not as a procedural rule.
inapplicable.” Id. at 15.
232. Danforth, 552 U.S. at 291 (quoting Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Smith, 496
U.S. 167, 205 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
233. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 101, at 16.
234. Id. at 17 (“A distinct application of a remedy available in state court ‘does
not imply that there [was] no right and thus no violation of that right at the time
of trial—only that no remedy will [be provided in federal habeas courts].’”
(quoting Danforth, 552 U.S. at 291)).
235. Id. at 15 (citing State v. Jeffries, 787 N.W.2d 654, 660–61 (Minn. Ct. App.
2010), rev’d, 806 N.W.2d 56 (Minn. 2011)).
236. Id. at 18.
237. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 83, at 13.
238. 417 U.S. 21, 30–31 (1974).
239. Id. at 30.
240. 409 U.S. 505, 509 (1973).
241. State v. Jeffries, 806 N.W.2d 56, 65 (Minn. 2011).
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While the State incorrectly characterized Jeffries’s second
guilty plea as forfeiting a double-jeopardy plea, its argument points
persuasively to the fact that Jeffries was not in danger of double
jeopardy because Jeffries’s second plea was the continuation of plea
242
negotiations after the first deal was rejected.
He was not
punished twice—rather he was trying to “mitigate his risk” within
the one and only negotiation of his sentence, prior to any finality of
243
judgment.
The court was correct that non-assertion of a doublejeopardy claim could not forfeit the right to plead double jeopardy
on appeal, but it was incorrect to decide that the conviction at the
first plea hearing raised double-jeopardy concerns and barred
subsequent vacation of that plea.
V. CONCLUSION
The court correctly adopted the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding
in Menna, concluding that Jeffries’s second guilty plea did not bar a
244
double-jeopardy claim.
Jeffries appropriately brought Minnesota
precedent in line with U.S. Supreme Court precedent. However,
the court incorrectly analyzed Jeffries’s double-jeopardy claim.
The majority failed to analyze whether the conviction at the
first plea hearing should have barred the second guilty plea under
the Double Jeopardy Clause. Chief Justice Gildea’s dissenting
opinion correctly criticized the majority’s analysis as “overly
245
simplistic.”
The majority ignored important policy analysis in
determining whether a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause
occurred, and its favoritism of finality will have far-reaching
consequences on the accuracy of future sentences based on plea
agreements. Especially in domestic violence cases, the goal of
imposing appropriate sentences should outweigh any sense of
finality attached to acceptances of plea agreements. To further the
policies of both finality and accuracy, the court should have
extended the fair and just standard to judges who seek to vacate a
guilty plea when new information regarding the defendant
convinces them that a plea agreement is inappropriate.

242.
243.
244.
245.

Respondent’s Brief, supra note 101, at 17–18.
Id. at 18.
Jeffries, 806 N.W.2d at 65.
Id. at 70 (Gildea, C.J., dissenting).
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